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Abstract 
 
Many legal rules can be interpreted as creating options. Option pricing is thus important 
for understanding the ex ante effects of these rules. And, recognizing that individuals, 
whose behavior the law aims to influence, are imperfectly rational, a behavioral option 
pricing model is a potentially helpful tool for legal policy. This paper develops such a 
model and applies it to a series of legal problems in tort law, contract law, corporate law 
and criminal law.  
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1.  Introduction 
Many legal rules provide individuals with choices or options. What is the value of 
these legal options? How do they influence the ex ante decision to engage in the option-
bearing activity? O ption pricing theory, initially developed to calculate the value of 
financial options, and more recently applied to price real options in business contexts, can 
also be used, and indeed has been used albeit sparingly, to value legal options. Option 
pricing is important for individuals affected by option-creating rules. And a better 
understanding of how individuals price options is important for law-makers intent on 
affecting individual behavior through  legal options. In particular, imperfect rationality 
may significantly affect option pricing and thus individual behavior. This paper hopes to 
advance our understanding of behavioral option pricing, and to explore its implications 
for legal policymaking. 
Option structure is pervasive in the law. Many legal rules require or allow 
individuals to choose between two or more options. To quote Ian Ayres: “In Hohfeldian 
terms, every “privilege” is an option to do some act and every “power” is the option to 
change some legal relation.” (Ayres, forthcoming, p. 5) Contract law either mandates or 
facilitates a multitude of option structures, the best known being the promisor’s choice 
between performing the contract or breaching the contract and paying damages (see, e.g., 
Katz, 2004; Scott & Triantis, 2004).  Recent scholarship has emphasized the  option 
structure underlying the broad liability rule category (see, e.g., Ayres, forthcoming). Tort 
law provides the potential tortfeasor with a choice between avoiding (or reducing) the 
risk of harm and bearing liability for failure to prevent (or reduce) the risk of harm. 
Criminal sanctions create a similar choice: obey the law or bear the sanction for breaking   2 
the law. In corporate law, the limited liability principle gives the entrepreneur an option 
not to pay her company’s debt. When an entitlement is encroached upon, the law often 
gives the entitlement owner a choice between injunctive relief and monetary damages. 
Consumer protection law guarantees, in certain circumstances, an option to return the 
merchandize. And the list continues. 
The law creates many ex post choices. Ex ante, individuals will often be uncertain 
about the choice that they or others will end up making. Option pricing determines the ex 
ante value of the legally-created ex post choice, and thus directly affects the ex ante 
incentives created by legal rules. This ex ante perspective should be distinguished from 
the ex post perspective that has largely dominated the legal options literature. The focus 
of this literature has been on the use of options to efficiently allocate entitlements ex post. 
Hence, option pricing theory with its inherent ex ante perspective has not been invoked. 
(See Ayres, forthcoming.
1)  
Two important exceptions should be noted. Ex ante considerations have taken 
center stage in the options-oriented contracts literature. This literature recognizes that the 
value of an ex post option provided for in the contract affects the ex ante contract price 
(see, e.g., Mahoney, 1995; Katz, 2004; Scott & Triantis, 2004). Similarly, in the litigation 
context, the value of the options to negotiate a settlement, to acquire information and to 
abandon the lawsuit have been shown to significantly affect the ex ante value of a legal 
claim (see Cornell, 1990; Bebchuk, 1996, Huang & Grundfest, 2004). 
                                                 
1 This is not to say that Ayres ignores ex ante concerns. On the contrary, Ayres emphasizes that his 
‘decoupling result’ allows courts to promote ex ante efficiency without compromising ex post efficiency. 
Moreover, when discussing ‘election of remedies’ put options, Ayres considers how these options deter or 
facilitate the initial taking (Ayres, forthcoming, pp. 48-52). But Ayres does not use option pricing theory to 
explore the ex ante implications of legal options. Bebchuk (2001) develops an ex ante model comparing the 
incentive effects of property rules and liability rules. Bebchuk, however, does not explicitly treat liability 
rules as options and does not engage in option pricing.   3 
If option pricing determines the ex ante incentives generated by many legal rules, it 
is important to develop an accurate account of how individuals price options. Option 
theory tells us how options should be priced, or how perfectly rational decision-makers 
price options (see  Brealey and Myers, 2003). But not everyone is perfectly rational. 
Specifically, in the domain of legal options, where market forces cannot always be relied 
upon to weed out any hint of irrationality (see Jolls et al., 1998, p. 1473), it is often 
unrealistic to assume that those affected by legal options engage in rational option 
pricing. It is thus valuable—both descriptively and from a legal policy perspective—to 
study the implications of behavioral option pricing. 
Imperfect rationality may affect option pricing in many ways. Behavioral finance 
has only begun to explore the implications of imperfect rationality for the pricing of 
financial options (see, e.g., Stein, 1989; Shefrin, 2001, 2005). This paper does not purport 
to develop a comprehensive behavioral option pricing model. Rather, it focuses on two 
cognitive biases that seem especially important in the real options context: optimism and 
overconfidence. Assume that an individual understands the option structure. For example, 
at T=0 the individual understands that at T=1 she will face an option to buy an asset at a 
predetermined price (uncertainty regarding the exercise price will be introduced shortly). 
The ex ante value of this option is determined by the distribution of T=1 values that the 
asset can take, as perceived at T=0. Accordingly, the distortions created by behavioral 
option pricing will derive from the individual’s potentially biased perception of the 
distribution of asset values. 
Suppose that the actual distribution of asset values that underlies the option is fully 
characterized by its mean and variance. An optimistic individual perceives a distribution   4 
of asset values with too large a mean (as if the actual distribution is shifted to the right).
2 
An overconfident individual, while possibly perceiving a correct mean, believes that the 
variance of the distribution is smaller than it actually is (i.e. the perceived distribution is 
too tight).
3 Of course, individuals can be both optimistic and overconfident 
simultaneously. 
The analytical distinction between optimism and overconfidence, defined in terms 
of the first and second moments of a probability distribution, sits well with the treatment 
of these two biases in the cognitive psychology literature and the terminology employed 
in this literature.
4 It should be noted, however, that the behavioral economics literature 
sometimes adopts a different terminology, using both “optimism” and “overconfidence” 
to refer to a mean-related bias.
5 Moreover, while the mean-related bias, optimism, has 
received more attention in the behavioral economics and the behavioral law and 
economics literatures, it is the options framework with its f ocus on volatility that 
highlights the importance of the variance-related bias, overconfidence.  
                                                 
2 The prevalence of the optimism bias has been demonstrated in numerous studies. See, e.g., Cyert, Dill and 
March (1958), Weinstein (1980), Taylor (1989), Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), Babcock and Loewenstein 
(1997), Langevoort (1997), Camerer and Lovallo (1999), and Bazerman (2002). The exploding behavioral 
finance literature documents investor optimism. See, e.g., Lamont and Thaler (2003). 
3 The prevalence of the overconfidence bias is well recognized. See, e.g., Alpert and Raiffa (1969), 
Lichtenstein et al. (1977), Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Griffin and Tversky (1992), and Bazerman 
(2002). Lichtenstein et al. (1977) summarize the evidence as follows: “The overwhelming evidence from 
research on uncertain quantities is that people’s probability distributions tend to be too tight.” (at p. 314). 
Arrow (1982), summarizing the evidence form an economics perspectives, writes: “there is a tendancy to 
underestimate uncertainties.” Tversky and Kahneman (1974) argue that the overconfidence bias stems from 
the anchoring and (insufficient) adjustment heuristic. In the financial options context, Stein (1989) found 
that investors tend to overweight recent information and underweight long term tendencies (i.e. 
systematically ignore mean reversion) in stock price volatility. See also Thaler (1993), Part II (collecting 
articles demonstrating the prevalence of irrational expectations regarding stock price volatility). 
4 See references cited in notes 2 and 3 above. 
5 See, e.g., Bazerman and Zajac (1991) and Camerer and Lovallo (1999). Other behavioral economics 
papers distinguish overconfidence from optimism and define overconfidence in a way similar to the 
definition proposed in the present study. See, e.g., Kyle and Wang (1997), Rabin and Schrag (1999) and 
Bernardo and Welch (2001). The optimism and overconfidence biases, as defined here, also relate to the 
displacement and variability biases, as defined in Spetzler and Stael von Holstein (1975).    5 
Not surprisingly, optimism increases the perceived value of the option-generating 
activity. But this overall effect of optimism often occurs despite the contrary effect of 
optimism on the perceived value of the option. This claim merits some clarification. 
Consider first an activity that includes a call option. Optimism increases the perceived 
value of the call option, and accordingly increases the perceived value of the activity. No 
surprises so far. Now consider an activity that includes a put option. Optimism reduces 
the perceived value of the put option by reducing the perceived likelihood that the option 
will be exercised as well as the perceived value of the option conditional on exercise.  
But when studying the effects of optimism on the perceived value of an activity that 
includes a put option, it might be misleading to focus only on the option component. 
Such an activity will often also include the asset underlying the put option. And optimism 
will affect the perceived values of both the option component and the non-option 
component of the activity. While optimism reduces the perceived value of the option 
component, it increases the perceived value of the non-option component. An optimist 
will overvalue the underlying asset and will also overestimate the likelihood of retaining 
the overvalued asset (recall that the optimist underestimates the likelihood of exercising 
the option to sell the asset). And since the effects of optimism on the  non-option 
component dominate the effects of optimism on the option c omponent, optimism 
increases the perceived value of the activity. 
Unlike financial options to buy or sell positive-value assets, legal options are often 
best characterized as having an underlying liability, rather than an underlying asset. 
Consider, for example, the option to unload an obligation to compensate a potential 
victim for harm that the injurer’s activity might cause at the price of exercising due care   6 
(the cost of due care can be interpreted as the option’s exercise price). The definition of 
optimism is sensitive to the asset versus liability framing. In the preceding example, an 
optimistic injurer will  underestimate the harm-generating potential of her activity and 
accordingly will underestimate the liability underlying the legal option.  
It is therefore important to distinguish between asset-based options and liability-
based options according to the distribution  of asset values or of liability values  that 
underlies the option.  Separating asset-based and liability-based options reveals a 
symmetry between asset-based call options and liability-based put options, and a 
corresponding symmetry between asset-based put options and liability-based call options. 
The effects of optimism, however, are asymmetric. Optimism increases the perceived 
value of an asset-based call option but reduces the perceived value of the equivalent 
liability-based put option. Similarly, optimism reduces the perceived value of an asset-
based put option but increases the perceived value of a liability-based call option. 
Luckily, the aggregate effect of optimism on the perceived value of the option-
generating activity is not sensitive to the asset versus liability framing. While optimism 
reduces the perceived value of a liability-based put option it increases the perceived value 
of the non-option component of the activity. And since this latter effect is dominant, 
optimism increases the overall perceived value of the activity. Similarly, optimism 
reduces the perceived value of asset-based put options, but nevertheless increases the 
perceived value of the option-generating activity. To sum up, for all the four types of 
options identified above—asset-based calls, asset-based puts, liability-based calls and 
liability-based puts—optimism increases the perceived value of the option-generating 
activity.   7 
Overconfidence constitutes a countervailing force to  optimism, leading to 
systematic underpricing of legal options and a corresponding undervaluation of option-
generating activities.  Readers familiar with option pricing theory  should not find this 
result surprising. The value of an option is increasing in the volatility of the underlying 
asset (see Black and Scholes, 1973; Brealey and Myers, 2003). If overconfidence leads to 
underestimation of volatility, it also leads to undervaluation of the option. This intuition 
also explains why, unlike optimism, overconfidence affects only the option component of 
an activity’s value, and is not sensitive  to the asset versus liability framing of the 
distribution of values that underlies the option. 
The overconfidence effect is best understood through an example. An entrepreneur 
considers building a factory at a certain location. At this ex ante stage the entrepreneur 
does not know how much revenue the factory will produce; she only knows the 
distribution of possible revenues. The entrepreneur also knows that  the factory will 
produce some level of pollution; and if  the entrepreneur at the ex post stage decides to 
operate the factory, rather than shut down, she will have to compensate residents living in 
proximity to the factory for damages caused by this pollution. Assume for now that the 
amount of damages in known ex ante (further assume that the mean revenue is larger than 
the amount of damages). Put differently, if she decides to build the factory, the 
entrepreneur will have an option either to operate the factory and pay the legally-
determined price in damages, or to shut-down. The entrepreneur will decide to operate 
and pay damages, namely to purchase the right to pollute, if and only if the revenue 
generated by the factory turns out to be higher than the legal price.    8 
The value of the option to  pollute depends on the likelihood that the  revenue 
generated by the factory will exceed the threshold value defined by the damage measure. 
When an overconfident  entrepreneur perceives an excessively tight distribution of 
revenue values, she will underestimate the likelihood of high revenues and she will also 
underestimate the likelihood of low revenues. The former underestimation leads the 
overconfident entrepreneur to underestimate the value of building the factory; the latter 
underestimation leads her to overestimate this value. Absent an option to shut down, 
these  two  effects cancel out. But given the option to shut down and avoid paying 
damages, the former effect dominates, implying an overall underestimation of the value 
of building the factory. 
Another layer of complexity is added to the behavioral option pricing model when 
the deterministic exercise price assumption is relaxed. In many non-legal contexts the 
option's exercise price is known ex ante with certainty, and hence optimism and 
overconfidence affect only the perceived distribution of values of the underlying asset or 
liability. Legal options on the other hand often have a stochastic exercise price. The case 
where the exercise price is a court-determined sanction or damages award exemplifies the 
common uncertainty surrounding the exercise price of legal options. With a stochastic 
exercise price optimism and overconfidence play a dual role. They influence the 
perceived option value by distorting both the perceived distribution of  values of the 
underlying asset (or liability) and the perceived distribution of values of the exercise 
price.  
This added complexity is tackled by demonstrating that the stochastic exercise price 
can be interpreted as creating a second option, which can then be priced using the basic   9 
behavioral option pricing model  developed for  the  deterministic exercise price case. 
Consider again the pollution example, now allowing for uncertainty with respect to the 
damage award. To focus on the option created by the stochastic exercise price assume, 
for a moment, that the revenue generated by the factory is known with certainty ex ante. 
This new option is characterized by an underlying stochastic liability, the damages that 
the entrepreneur will be forced to pay, and an exercise price equal to the revenues that 
will have to be forgone if the entrepreneur, faced with a high liability realization, decides 
to shut down the factory. Applying the behavioral option pricing model, the option-
generating activity will be overvalued by an optimistic entrepreneur and undervalued by 
an overconfident entrepreneur.  
The behavioral option pricing model bears potentially important implications for 
legal policy. T he model predicts how actual option pricing will deviate from rational 
option pricing; and how actual behavior will correspondingly deviate from rational 
behavior. If the law seeks to influence behavior by creating options, it should benefit 
from a more complete understanding of how imperfectly rational individuals price 
options. The actual incentive effects of an option-creating legal rule may be very different 
from those predicted by a rational option pricing model. 
If liability for nuisance is aimed at deterring nuisance-generating activities, 
optimism might circumvent this goal, while overconfidence might lead to overdeterrence. 
But which is it—underdeterrence or overdeterrence? Is optimism the dominant bias or 
rather overconfidence or perhaps a third bias outside the scope of the basic model? In 
certain cases a dominant bias can be identified. Cognitive psychology  provides some 
guidance as to the contextual characteristics of situations that are more likely to trigger   10 
different biases. Moreover,  for  any combination of bias levels  the behavioral option 
pricing model can be used to identify the dominant bias. And even when the specific bias 
levels are not observable and the analyst or policymaker has only a rough estimate of the 
relative magnitudes of the two biases, still in many cases the model can identify the 
dominant bias. 
But even when the model can identify the dominant bias it is not clear that 
policymakers can. Even when the information necessary to identify the dominant bias 
exists, imperfectly rational policymakers might incorrectly interpret this information and 
might fail to identify the appropriate policy response even if they correctly interpret the 
information (on the imperfect rationality of government officials—see, e.g., Rachlinski 
and Parina, 2002). Moreover, if one considers the information necessary to apply the 
behavioral option pricing model more malleable than the information necessary to apply 
the standard rational choice model, then perhaps policymakers who cannot be trusted to 
pursue the public interest should not be granted this additional degree of freedom to 
manipulate policy to their private ends. 
 When the dominant bias can be identified the behavioral option pricing model 
yields concrete policy prescriptions. And when policymakers are sufficiently rational and 
sufficiently honest they may be able to effectively use the model to design better policy.  
In many situations, however, the dominant bias cannot be identified (or the dominant bias 
is not constant across a heterogeneous population). Even in these situations analysts and 
policymakers cannot ignore behavioral option pricing. At the very least the behavioral   11 
option pricing model reveals the uncertainty surrounding the incentive effects of legal 
options.
6 
The remainder of the paper is  organized  as follows. Section 2 develops the 
behavioral option pricing model. Section 3 explores the implications of behavioral option 
pricing for a series of legal problems in tort law, contract law, corporate law, criminal law 
and litigation. Section 4 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Behavioral Option Pricing 
2.1 Basic Calls and Puts 
I begin by exploring the implications of imperfect rationality for option pricing in a 
simple financial options model. Consider a basic European call/put option to buy/sell an 
asset at T=1 for a price, p (the option’s exercise price).
7 At T=1, when the options can be 
exercised, the value of the underlying asset is x. At T=0 the option holder knows only the 
distribution from which the T=1 value of the asset will be drawn. This distribution is 
characterized by the density function  ) (x f  and the cumulative distribution function F(x), 
where  [ ] b a x x f ,   0 ) ( ˇ " = . Let  x  and 
2 s  denote the mean and variance of the 
distribution, respectively.
8 A rational, unbiased agent would price the call option at 
                                                 
6 Compare: Hillman, 2000, who argues that behavioral decision theory is useful for identifying problems 
with rational choice predictions, but often cannot provide sufficiently robust alternative predictions. 
7 The analysis in this paper focuses on European options. However, the main results apply to American 
options as well. 
8 While  the time horizon of the option is not explicitly modeled, it is captured though the variance 
parameter (since a longer time horizon generally implies a higher variance).    12 
( ) ( ) p x p x E p x P > - ￿ > = Pr , or  ( ) ￿ ￿ ￿ - =
b
p
dx x f p x P ) ( , and the put option at 
( ) ( ) p x x p E p x P < - ￿ < = Pr , or  ( ) ￿ ￿ ￿ - =
p
a
dx x f x p P ) ( . 
How would an imperfectly rational agent price these options? I consider two types 
of biases, with respect to the value distribution: (1) a mean bias, i.e., optimism (or 
pessimism); and (2) a variance bias, i.e., overconfidence (or underconfidence). Optimism 
is defined as the difference between the mean of the perceived distribution,  x ˆ, and the 
mean of the actual distribution,  x :  x x
opt - = D ˆ . O verconfidence is defined as the 
difference between the variance of the actual distribution, 
2 s , and the variance of the 
perceived distribution, 
2 ˆ s : 
2 2 ˆ s s - = D
conf .
9 Let  ) ( ˆ x f  denote the d istribution, as 
perceived by an imperfectly rational agent, suffering from optimism and overconfidence. 
This imperfectly rational agent will price the call option at  ( ) ￿ ￿ ￿ - =
b
p
dx x f p x P
ˆ
) ( ˆ ˆ , and 
the put option at  ( ) ￿ ￿ ￿ - =
p
a
dx x f x p P
ˆ
) ( ˆ ˆ . For expositional clarity, I assume that both  ) (￿ f  
and  ) ( ˆ ￿ f  are symmetric and single-peaked.
10  
The following proposition summarizes the implications of optimism and 
overconfidence for option pricing. 
                                                 
9 Although theoretically individuals can be pessimistic as well as optimistic and underconfident as well as 
overconfident, the analysis focuses on optimism and overconfident defined by  0 > D
opt  and  0 > D
conf . 
While in the financial options context this constraint would probably be excessively restrictive, it seems 
rather innocuous in the context of real, and specifically legal, options. 
10  This assumption, while clearly restrictive, captures a broad range of realistic distributions.  The 
assumption that  ) ( ˆ ￿ f  is symmetric is more difficult to defend. Still, in this preliminary attempt to formally 
model the implications of optimism and overconfidence for option pricing the tractability benefits of the 
symmetry assumption justify the compromise in descriptive accuracy.   13 
 
Proposition 1:  
(i) An optimistic individual would overprice the call  option and underprice the p ut 
option; 
(ii) an overconfident individual would underprice the call and put options. 
 
Remark: The intuition for this result, which is proved in the appendix, is as follows: 
(i) An optimistic individual places excessive weight on the high-value end of the 
distribution. Accordingly, the optimist overestimates the likelihood that she will exercise 
the call option as well as the ex post value of the underlying asset conditional upon the 
exercise of the option. Therefore, an optimist will overprice the call option. On the other 
hand, the optimist underestimates the likelihood that she will exercise the put option as 
well as the ex post value of the sale conditional upon the exercise of the option (the 
optimist overestimates the value of the asset, and thus underestimates the difference 
between the exercise price and the value of the asset). Therefore, an optimist will 
underprice the put option.
11 
(ii) The value of both call and put options increases with the volatility of the value of the 
underlying asset (see Black and Scholes, 1973; Brealey and Myers, 2003, p. 581). An 
overconfident individual will underestimate volatility and thus underprice the options.
12 
                                                 
11 That optimism can lead to undervaluation of an option is counterintuitive, as optimism is closely 
associated with overvaluation. As long as the option holder understands what a put option is, however, 
overvaluation of the option can only arise from optimism regarding the option's exercise price, which is 
only plausible when the exercise price is not known with certainty. See Section 2.4 below. (Overvaluation 
can also arise from undervaluation of the underlying asset, but such undervaluation seems inconsistent with 
an intuitive notion of optimism, especially since the option holder may end up keeping the asset.) 
12 The reasoning underlying this result is a bit more subtle, especially when allowing for the possibility that 
p x > ˆ . See the proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix.   14 
 
2.2  Assets-Based versus Liability-Based Options 
The basic financial call and put options both have an underlying asset that can be 
bought (in the case of a call option) or sold (in the case of a put option) at a positive 
exercise price. While some legal options share this characteristic, others are  best 
characterized as having an underlying liability, rather than an underlying asset. Before 
delving into specific legal applications of the behavioral option pricing model, it is useful 
to  provide a general account of asset-based versus liability-based o ptions, and to 
explicate the implications of behavioral option pricing for each class of options. 
The liability-based options can be perceived as the mirror-image of the asset-based 
options. An asset-based call option to buy an asset  0 > x  for  0 > p  corresponds to a 
liability-based put option to sell a liability  0 < x  for  0 < p , i.e., the option-holder pays 
0 > p  when exercising the option. Specifically, the value of a liability-based put option 
is  ( ) ( ) p x p x E p x > - ￿ > Pr , precisely the value of the corresponding asset-based call 
option. And an asset-based put option to sell an asset  0 > x  for  0 > p  corresponds to a 
liability-based call option to purchase a liability  0 < x  for  0 < p , i.e., the option-holder 
gets  0 > p  when exercising the option. Specifically, the value of a liability-based call 
option is  ( ) ( ) p x x p E p x < - ￿ < Pr , precisely the value of  the corresponding asset-
based put option. The symmetry between the asset-based options and the liability-based 
options is depicted in figure 1. 
 
   15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The implications of optimism and overconfidence for asset-based options were 
summarized in Proposition 1. How do these implications translate to liability-based 
options? The overconfidence bias has an identical effect on asset-based and liability-
based options. In both cases, the lower perceived volatility reduces the perceived value of 
the option. The optimism bias, however, operates differently on asset-based  versus 
liability based options.  Since optimism is sensitive to the benefit/cost framing of an 
asset/liability, the implications of the optimism bias for option pricing are sensitive to 
such framing effects.  
Compare an asset-based call option to the equivalent liability-based put option. For 
the asset-based call option, optimism implies a greater perceived likelihood of high value 
realizations, which in turn implies a greater perceived likelihood that the option will be 
-p 
p  -p 
p 
0 
asset/ 
put 
liab./ 
call 
liab./ 
put 
asset/ 
call 
x 
Figure 1: The symmetry between asset-based and liability-based options   16 
exercised as well as a higher perceived ex post value conditional upon exercise of the 
option. Accordingly, optimism increases the perceived value of asset-based call options. 
The opposite is true  for the corresponding  liability-based put option, where optimism 
implies a lower perceived likelihood of high (absolute) value realizations, which in turn 
implies a lower perceived likelihood that the option will be exercised as well as a lower 
perceived ex post value conditional upon exercise of the option. Optimism thus reduces 
the perceived value of liability-based put options. A similar comparison between an 
asset-based put option and the equivalent liability-based call option reveals that while 
optimism reduces the perceived value of the former it increases the perceived value of the 
latter. 
Corollary 1 summarizes the implications of behavioral option pricing for the four 
identified categories of options: asset-based calls, asset-based puts, liability-based calls 
and liability-based puts. 
 
Corollary 1:  
(i) An optimistic individual would overprice both the asset-based and the liability-based 
call options and would underprice both the asset-based and the liability-based put 
options; 
(ii) an overconfident individual would underprice all four option types. 
 
2.3  Cognitive Biases Regarding Underlying Assets or Liabilities 
The ultimate goal of the present analysis is to expose the implications of behavioral 
option pricing for ex ante decisions, specifically for the decision whether to engage in the   17 
option-bearing activity. But the effect of cognitive biases on the perceived value of an 
activity is not limited to their effect on the option component. Specifically, when the 
activity includes an asset or liability plus a put option to unload the asset or liability, the 
behavioral valuation of this activity can be decomposed into a behavioral valuation of the 
standalone asset or liability and a behavioral pricing of the put option. Note that with a 
call option, the option is to buy an asset or liability, so there is no standalone asset or 
liability that needs to be evaluated in addition to the option component. 
The effects of cognitive biases on the standalone asset or liability are confined to 
the optimism bias. Overconfidence affects only the option component of an activity’s 
valuation; hence the overall effect of overconfidence on the value of the activity equals 
the effect of overconfidence on the option component. Optimism, on the other hand, 
affects both the option and non-option components.  
Consider first an activity that includes an asset plus an asset-based put option. 
While optimism leads to underpicing of the option component (see Corollary 1), thus 
reducing the perceived value of the activity, it also leads to  overestimation of the 
standalone asset, thus increasing the perceived value of the activity. To see which effect 
dominates it is helpful to exploit put-call parity (see Brealey & Myers, 2003). 
Specifically, note that the value of a standalone asset plus a put option to sell the asset is 
equal to the value of a call option on the asset plus the exercise price: 
( ) ( ) p dx x f p x dx x f x p x
b
p
p
a
+ ￿ ￿ - = ￿ ￿ - + ￿ ￿ ) ( ) ( . 
The overall effect of optimism on the value of the activity is therefore equal to the effect 
of optimism on the pricing of a call option. Namely optimism increases the overall 
perceived value of the activity.   18 
Next consider an activity that includes a liability plus a liability-based put option. 
Again, optimism leads to underpicing of the option component (see Corollary 1), thus 
reducing the perceived value of the activity, but it also leads to underestimation of the 
standalone  liability, thus increasing the perceived value of the activity. And again the 
non-option effect is dominant, implying that optimism increases the perceived value of 
the activity. 
These results, which are formally proved in the appendix, are summarized in 
Corollary 2. 
 
Corollary 2: With respect to an activity that includes an asset plus a put option to sell the 
asset or a liability plus a put option to unload the liability- 
(i) an optimistic individual would overestimate the value of the activity; while 
(ii) an overconfident individual would underestimate the value of the activity. 
 
2.4  Options with a Stochastic Exercise Price 
I have thus far focused on options with a deterministic exercise price. The exercise 
price of standard financial options is generally known with certainty ex ante. But the 
same is not true for legal options. On the contrary most legal options have a stochastic 
exercise price. The polluting factory example, where the exercise price equals a court-
determined damages amount is illustrative. In this example, uncertainty about the 
magnitude of the harm caused by the pollution as well as uncertainty about the court’s   19 
assessment of this harm contributes to the overall uncertainty surrounding the option’s 
exercise price.
13 
What is the value of an option with a stochastic exercise price? Consider first an 
asset-based call option with a stochastic exercise price. The implications of a stochastic 
exercise price on the value of the option can best be understood by positing, for a 
moment, a deterministic return x. With a deterministic x and a stochastic exercise price, p, 
the value of the call option is equivalent to the value of a liability-based put option to 
unload the “obligation” to pay p for an exercise price of  x -  (the option-holder pays x, 
i.e., she forgoes the asset). A call option with a stochastic exercise price is therefore 
really a combination of both an asset-based call option and a liability-based put option 
(See Fischer, 1978 for the general formula for pricing options with an uncertain exercise 
price.) 
How do optimism and overconfidence affect the perceived value of an asset-based 
call option with a stochastic exercise price? W hen the exercise price is  stochastic, 
optimism and overconfidence will affect not only the perceived distribution of values of 
the underlying asset but also the perceived distribution of values of the exercise price. 
Since an option with a stochastic exercise price can be viewed as a double option, I 
consider the behavioral pricing of each option component in turn. Starting with the asset-
based call option, Proposition 1 has shown that optimism increases the perceived value of 
the option while overconfidence reduces the perceived value of the option. Moving on to 
the liability-based put option, Corollary 2 has shown that here too optimism increases the 
                                                 
13 Clearly not all of this uncertainty will be resolved at the time when the option matures, namely when the 
factory owner needs to choose whether to exercise the option (specifically, some uncertainty regarding the 
court’s assessment of the harm will generally persist at this stage). From an option pricing perspective, 
however, only the uncertainty that is resolved between the ex ante pricing stage and the ex post exercise 
stage is relevant.   20 
perceived value of the option-generating activity while overconfidence reduces the 
perceived value of the activity.  
Similar results can be derived for the three other option types—asset-based puts, 
liability-based calls and liability-based puts—when the exercise price is stochastic. To 
sum up, recognizing that legal options commonly have a stochastic exercise price does 
not change the qualitative results stated in Proposition 1 and its corollaries—that 
optimism increases the perceived value of the option-generating activity and 
overconfidence reduces the perceived value of the activity. Quantitatively, however, 
since a stochastic exercise price effectively adds a second option component the 
magnitudes of the aforementioned effects of optimism and overconfidence will generally 
be larger than in the basic deterministic exercise price model. 
 
2.5  Identifying the Dominant Bias 
Proposition 1 and its corollaries have shown that optimism and overconfidence pull 
the perceived value of the option-generating activity in opposite directions. Will an 
option-holder suffering from both biases overvalue or undervalue the activity? 
Unfortunately a general answer cannot be provided. However, for a non-negligible 
subgroup of cases, the dominant bias can be identified.  
Cognitive psychology provides some guidance as to the contextual characteristics 
of situations that are more likely to trigger different biases. For example, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) argue that overconfidence is a product of the anchoring and 
(insufficient) adjustment heuristic. Accordingly, the overconfidence bias can be expected 
to be more pronounced in situations where a salient anchor controls the option-holders   21 
perception  of the value of the underlying asset or liability. In the polluting factory 
example,  information on revenues generated by a similar factory  can provide such an 
anchor. And regarding the second option created by the stochastic exercise price, an 
especially relevant precedent, where a similar factory was forced to pay damages for 
pollution-related harm, can provide a dominating anchor.  
Moving on to optimism, the cognitive psychology literature  provides some 
guidance as to when optimism is more likely to pose a serious problem. Specifically, 
when the object of the optimism bias appears controllable by the decision-maker a 
stronger manifestation of the bias can be expected (see, e.g., Weinstein, 1980). In the 
polluting factory example, the revenues generated by the factory will likely appear 
controllable to the factory owner, suggesting a significant optimism bias. 
When the characteristics of a scenario suggest a strong optimism bias but a 
relatively weak overconfidence bias, overvaluation of the option-generating activity is 
likely. And, conversely, when the characteristics of a scenario suggest a strong 
overconfidence bias but a relatively weak optimism bias, undervaluation of the option-
generating activity is likely. The remaining question is quantitative: how much optimism 
is needed to overcome a given level of overconfidence, and vice versa? 
The answer to this question is also context dependent. Still important 
generalizations can be drawn. Consider the basic asset-based call option. Assume that the 
possible values of the underlying asset are Normally distributed with a mean of  x  and a 
standard deviation of s . An imperfectly rational option-holder perceives a distribution of 
asset values with a mean of  x ˆ  and a standard deviation of s ˆ  (I assume that the perceived 
distribution is still a Normal distribution – see note 10 above). For different values of the   22 
exercise price, p, of  x  and of  s , it is possible to derive the threshold level of optimism 
that is needed to overcome any level of overconfidence, and vice versa. These threshold 
values can be calculated by numerically solving the following equation: 
( ) ( ) P dx x f p x dx x f p x P
b
p
b
p
= ￿ ￿ - = ￿ ￿ - = ￿ ￿ ) ( ) ( ˆ ˆ
ˆ
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Figure 2 presents the results of a series of numeric calculations using the parameter 
values  5 = x  and of  2 = s .  Each curve in f igure 2 presents the  threshold values of 
optimism and overconfidence for a different exercise price: p = 3 in the lowest curve, p = 
5 in the intermediate curve, and  p = 7 in the highest curve. For any curve bias 
combinations above the curve lead to overvaluation of the option, while bias combination 
below the curve lead to undervaluation of the option. 
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Figure 2: Optimism versus overconfidence – identifying the dominant bias   23 
Figure 2 illustrates several results. First, it emphasizes the significant effect of the 
option’s exercise price on the relative importance of the optimism and overconfidence 
biases. A lower exercise price translates into a broader range of bias combinations where 
optimism dominates and overvaluation ensues. Second, optimism enjoys an increasing 
marginal impact, while overconfidence suffers from a decreasing marginal impact. This 
“advantage” of the optimism bias is especially pronounced for lower exercise prices. 
Finally, while figure 2 may appear to suggest that optimism is more likely to be the 
dominant bias, a closer look reveals that this is not necessarily the case. The cognitive 
psychology literature suggests that a perceived standard deviation equal to half the actual 
standard deviation is typical (based on confidence interval data reported by Kahneman 
and Tverskey, 1974). In figure 2 this translates into a perceived standard deviation of 1. 
Accordingly, an optimism level of approximately 30% would be required to offset the 
underestimation effect of the overconfidence bias. 
The preceding analysis provides general guidelines for identifying the dominant 
bias. The proposed framework is mainly descriptive, rather than prescriptive, since the 
characteristics of a situation that determine which bias is dominant in that situation are 
often unobservable to policymakers, and even when they are observable their value may 
vary across situations that cannot be separately regulated. Moreover, even the descriptive 
value of the proposed framework is limited by the possibility that other biases not 
modeled here dominate the effects of both optimism and overconfidence (see Section 4.1 
below).  
 
   24 
3.  Behavioral Pricing of Legal Options 
Many legal rules can be described as creating options. Section 3 studies a series of 
legal options and explores the implications of behavioral option pricing in each legal 
context. 
 
3.1 Liability Rules: The Nuisance Law Example 
At least sine Morris (1993), i t has been recognized that liability rules can be 
characterized as call options. The standard example in this option-oriented literature has 
been the  nuisance example. I too begin with a generalized nuisance/conflicting uses 
example. 
Consider the following  stylized conflicting uses scenario. At T=0 individual X 
chooses whether to participate in a certain activity. At T=1, if X proceeds with the 
activity, the activity will generate a stochastic return x (to X) and a harm y to individual 
Y. If X chooses to proceed with the activity, she will have to pay damages that are a 
function of the harm caused,  ) (y L . Put differently, X faces an option: proceed with the 
activity and pay  ) (y L , or abort the activity and lose x.
14  
If X decides to participate in the activity, then at T=1 she learns the realization of x 
and must choose between abandoning the activity  or proceeding with the activity and 
paying damages. X will proceed with the activity if and only if  ) (y L x > . X has an option 
to  buy the right to proceed with  the  activity for a price of  ) (y L  (Y has the initial 
                                                 
14 More generally, y measures the difference between the values of Y’s use with and without X’s activity. 
(In the specific case where Y’s use is valueless given X’s activity, y measures the value of Y’s use without 
X’s activity.) And, x measures the cost to X of adjusting her activity to avoid the harm to Y. (Only if the 
only option is total abandonment of the activity does x equal the total returns from the activity.) Thus, the 
scenario described in the text captures both Rule 2 and Rule 4 in the classic Calabresi and Melamed (1972) 
framework.   25 
entitlement). The T=0 value of this option is  ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( Pr y L x y L x E y L x P > - ￿ > = . 
When the liability cost is known ex ante, this is a standard call option, with an exercise 
price equal to the liability cost,  ) (y L  (the case where y and/or  ) (y L  is stochastic is 
considered below).  
This call option interpretation of liability rules is by now well understood. But, 
subject to a few important exceptions (Ayres, 2001, forthcoming; Bebchuk, 2001), the 
option-oriented analysis of  liability rules has largely taken an ex post perspective, 
focusing on the effects of  such rules on the ex post allocation of the entitlement. The 
focus of the current analysis is on the ex ante perspective. The legal call option increases 
the value of the option-generating activity. The magnitude of this increase is determined 
by the value of the option.  And, when the option-holder is imperfectly rational,  the 
perceived increase is determined by the perceived value of the option, as determined by 
the behavioral option pricing model. 
At T=0 when an individual considers whether to engage in a certain activity, she 
will weigh the costs and benefits of the activity. If the activity includes a legal option, the 
perceived value of this option will play a role in this cost-benefit calculation.  To the 
extent that legal rules are concerned with encouraging or  deterring participation in 
various activities, an assessment of the efficacy of these rules could benefit from a more 
realistic account of how individuals value the options that the law attaches to the 
regulated activities. 
The implications of behavioral option pricing—and specifically of optimism and 
overconfidence—for the perceived value of the legal option and of the option-generating 
activity follow immediately from Corollary 1, once the liability rule in the conflicting   26 
uses  scenario is identified as creating an asset-based call option. Specifically,  an 
optimistic individual would overestimate the value of the legal option and thus 
overestimate the value of the activity, and an overconfident individual would 
underestimate the value of the l egal option and thus underestimate the value of the 
activity. These results are strengthened when the additional option created by a stochastic 
exercise price is considered (see Section 2.4 above).
15 
If the dominant bias can be identified, then these results suggest the following 
policy implications: If the optimism bias is dominant, then individuals will engage in the 
activity too often, and  it may be desirable to increase liability, beyond the level that 
would be optimal in a world without cognitive biases. Conversely, if the overconfidence 
bias is dominant, then individuals will engage in the activity at a suboptimal rate, and it 
may be desirable to reduce liability below the level that would be optimal in a world 
without cognitive biases.
16 
                                                 
15 Generally not only x but also  ) (y L  are stochastic variables. Uncertainty with respect to  ) (y L  is a 
product of uncertainty with respect to the value of y, uncertainty with respect to the likelihood that harm 
caused will be translated into a legally imposed damages award, and uncertainty with respect to the 
relationship between the actual harm and the magnitude of the damages award. 
16 The focus of the analysis has been on the ramifications of behavioral option pricing for the ex ante value 
of an activity and on the corresponding propensity to engage in the activity. In some sense this perspective 
is too crude. In many cases, the question is not whether to engage in an activity, but rather how much to 
invest in the activity after an initial decision to engage in the activity has been made. (Technically, this 
more refined perspective relaxes the assumption that the distribution of asset values underlying the option, 
i.e., the  ) (x f  distribution, is exogenous. While this is the standard and uncontroversial assumption with 
respect to most financial options, it misses an important dimension of legal options and real options more 
generally.) This question has been thoroughly explored by Bebchuk (2001) in a rational choice framework. 
Optimism and overconfidence clearly influence an option-holder’s incentives to invest in the option-
generating activity. In the conflicting uses scenario, X’s incentive to invest in the activity directly depends 
on the likelihood that X will choose to exercise her option to proceed with the activity while harming Y (at 
the price of bearing tort liability), rather than abandon the activity. For instance, if optimism increases the 
perceived likelihood that the option would be exercised, X would have a greater incentive to invest. On the 
other hand, if overconfidence reduces the perceived likelihood that the option would be exercised, X would 
have a lesser incentive to invest. These implications require some qualification, however, if a higher/lower 
perceived x, due to optimism/overconfidence, may lead the option-holder to believe that marginal return 
from investment is lower/higher than it really is.   27 
The preceding analysis has focused on behavioral option pricing by the option-
holder. In some cases, however, behavioral option pricing might also distort ex ante 
decisions made by the non-option-holder. As Coase (1960) taught us, the conflicting uses 
scenario is inherently symmetric, in the sense that both uses are required to generate the 
conflict. Accordingly, in addition to analyzing X’s decision whether to engage in a 
conflicting activity, it is also  important to study Y’s decision whether to engage in a 
conflicting  activity. And Y’s decision will clearly be influenced by X’s option. The 
expected value of Y’s activity (to Y) is  ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( Pr y L y y L x y - ￿ > - . Thus the value of 
Y’s activity, as perceived by Y, depends on Y’s estimate of the probability that X will 
exercise her option, an estimate that will be affected by Y’s possibly biased beliefs about 
the distribution of x values. As suggested in Section 2.5, however, in the present case 
cognitive biases should pose a lesser concern  for the non-option-holder. The optimism 
bias can be expected to be relatively weak, since generally Y will not think that she has 
control over the distribution of  x values. And overconfidence should not present a 
significant concern, since Y is less likely to have a strong anchor regarding the level of 
the factory’s revenues. (Cognitive biases may pose a problem, if  y  and  ) (y L  are 
stochastic.)  
The nuisance/conflicting uses example is but one example of a legal rule that 
creates an asset-based call option. The preceding analysis is directly applicable to other 
legal contexts that share the same structure. For example, a seller, who signs a contract to 
sell a good to a buyer but expects to receive a higher bid from a second buyer, holds a 
call option to breach  the contract and sell the good to the second buyer. The exercise 
price of this option is the damages that the seller will need to pay the first buyer for   28 
breach of contract. (See also Subsection 3.3.) Common criminal law scenarios also share 
the same structure. An individual, who considers whether to engage in an activity  that 
might lead to a criminal prospect with a return x and an expected sanction L, faces a call 
option to “buy” x at an exercise price of L. (The baseline activity can be either legal or 
illegal. At T=0 an individual can establish a perfectly legal business that may provide a 
T=1 opportunity to engage in criminal  tax evasion. On the other hand, at T=0 an 
individual can decide to rob a bank, knowing that he might be forced to choose between 
abandoning the robbery (or making do with a smaller loot) or shooting a heroic bank 
teller; the exercise price of the option would be the additional sanction for shooting the 
teller.) 
 
3.2 Tort and Criminal Liability 
While the nuisance example illustrates a tort law asset-based call option, tort law 
also creates many liability-based put options. Consider the following stylized model. 
Individual X ,  a potential injurer, can prevent the risk of harm of magnitude  y to a 
potential victim, Y, at a cost, x. And X has an option to buy the “right” to harm Y, and to 
avoid the precaution cost x, at the legally-determined price of  ) (y L , the tort damage 
measure. Put differently, X has an option to unload a liability, the duty to expend x on 
precautionary measures, by paying  ) (y L . Criminal law creates similar liability-based put 
options. A criminal, X, facing an expected sanction  x, can avoid this liability by 
tampering with or fabricating evidence, by committing perjury, or by killing a witness—
all bearing the price of additional sanctions in case the evasion tactics fail.   29 
As stated in Corollary 1, both optimism and overconfidence lead to the underpricing 
of these liability-based put options. But in the tort law and criminal law scenarios 
described above, the option value is not the only relevant value component for the 
activity. The individual “owns” the underlying liability as well as the put option to unload 
the liability.  Accordingly, as stated in Corollary 2, optimism increases the perceived 
value of the activity, while overconfidence reduces the perceived value of the activity. 
Again these results are magnified when the exercise price,  ) (y L , is stochastic. In 
fact, in many tort and criminal law scenarios it is reasonable to assume that the cost of 
care, x, is known ex ante and that only the harm and the liability for harm caused are 
stochastic. As noted above, the results under this alternative assumption would be 
qualitatively similar. 
As in the nuisance/conflicting uses example, if the dominant bias can be identified, 
then these results suggest concrete policy implications, very similar to those outlined in 
the preceding subsection: If the optimism bias is dominant, then individuals will engage 
in the activity too often, and it may be desirable to increase liability, beyond the level that 
would be optimal in a world without cognitive biases. Conversely, if the overconfidence 
bias is dominant, then individuals will engage in the activity at a suboptimal rate, and it 
may be desirable to reduce liability below the level that would be optimal in a world 
without cognitive biases. 
 
3.3 Contract Law 
Contract law is option rich (see, e.g., Katz, 2004; Scott and Triantis, 2004). The 
most famous contractual option is the promisor’s choice between performance and breach   30 
under a money damages rule. The Section 3.1 model can be readily adjusted to capture 
this contract law option. Let y denote the value of performance to the promisee (Y), or 
equivalently the harm to the promisee in case of breach. And let x denote the value to the 
promisor (X) of the right to withhold performance. The law provides the promissor with 
an option to buy back his promise to perform at the legally-determined price of  ) (y L , the 
damage measure for breach of contract.
17 
When the promisor is a seller, the value to the promisor of the right to withhold 
performance is the result of either an increase in the actual cost of performance, or an 
increase in the alternative cost of performance caused by the appearance of a competing 
bid. If the reason for breach is an increase in the actual cost of performance, then the 
initial contract can be interpreted as including a liability—the obligation to perform—
plus a put option to unload this liability (and Corollary 2 applies). If the reason for breach 
is the appearance of a higher bid, the initial contract can be interpreted as including an 
asset-based call option (and Corollary 1 applies).
18 
When the promisor is a buyer, the value to the promisor of the right to withhold 
payment is the result of a possible decline in the value of the good or service to the buyer. 
The initial contract can thus be interpreted as including a liability—the obligation to pay 
the contract price—plus a put option to unload this liability (and Corollary 2 applies). 
                                                 
17 This description abstracts from the possibility of T=1 renegotiation. When  ) (y L  is defined by the 
expectation measure, then there will be no renegotiation anyway. When damages for breach deviate from 
the expectation measure, however, absent high transaction costs the parties will renegotiate the contract. 
Still, the option to breach will affect the outcome of the renegotiations. Accordingly, misperception 
regarding the likelihood and outcome of the renegotiation process will affect the perceived ex ante value of 
the option. 
18 The different reasons for breach may also affect the relative importance of the two cognitive biases. As 
explained in Section 2.5 above, overconfidence can be expected to create a more significant distortion 
when a salient anchor exists. When the likely cause of breach is an increase in the technological cost of 
performance, the normal cost presents a very powerful anchor. On the other hand, when the likely cause of 
breach is the appearance of a higher bid, no obvious anchor exists.   31 
Alternatively, the initial contract can be interpreted as creating a call option to secure 
performance by the seller with an exercise price equal to the portion of the contract price 
not paid ex ante as a non-refundable deposit (see Scott and Triantis, 2004 – stressing the 
call option interpretation). 
Behavioral option pricing determines the perceived value of the contract to the 
option-holder, the promisor, and accordingly affects the terms of the initial contract, 
specifically the price term (on the rational pricing of the option to breach and its ex ante 
implications—see Mahoney, 1995). If an optimistic seller overestimates the value of the 
option, she may be willing to accept a lower price. Conversely, if an overconfident seller 
underestimates the value of the option, she may demand a higher price. If an optimistic 
buyer overestimates the value of the option, she may be willing to pay a higher contract 
price. Conversely, if an overconfident buyer underestimates the value of the option, she 
may demand a lower contract price. Importantly, these implications of optimism and 
overconfidence are not sensitive to the framing of the contractual option as either a put 
option or a call option. 
At first glance, behavioral option pricing while raising some distributive concerns, 
through the aforementioned price effects, does not compromise efficiency. However, a 
deeper examination reveals several efficiency concerns. First, in borderline cases, an 
optimistic promisor, who overestimates the value of the option, might enter into an 
inefficient contract. On the other hand, undervaluation of the option by an overconfident 
promisor might prevent the parties from reaching a mutually-beneficial agreement. 
Second, and related, sophisticated parties (who price options rationally) might take 
advantage of less sophisticated parties (who are more susceptible to cognitive biases) by   32 
structuring contracts to include an option-component that will be inaccurately valued by 
the less sophisticated party. In other words, sophisticated parties might deviate from the 
efficient contract design in order to benefit from option mispricing by the less 
sophisticated parties. Thus, the overall size of the contractual pie might be compromised, 
as long as the sophisticated party receives a bigger slice. 
These results should not be surprising. When one or both parties misconceive the 
true value of the contract, mutual consent no longer guarantees that the transaction is 
Pareto efficient. Still, framing the problem in terms of behavioral (mis)pricing of options 
provides a common framework to study the (potentially adverse) implications of a broad 
array of contractual options (see Katz, 2004 and Scott and Triantis, 2004 for a 
comprehensive account of the multitude of contractual options). Moreover, the option 
framing highlights the role of the overconfidence bias, which has received little attention 
in the behaviorally-informed contracting literature. 
 
3.4 The Limited Liability Company 
The limited liability company allows individuals to e ngage in risky activities 
without bearing the full downside risk of these activities. Consider the following stylized 
model. At T=0 an entrepreneur invests initial capital, K, in the company and undertakes a 
project that at T=1 will yield a (net) stochastic return x. As long as the project yields a 
(net) return of  K x - ‡ , the entrepreneur bears the entire gain or loss from the project. But 
what happens when  K x - < ? Absent limited liability, and assuming she has sufficient 
additional capital from personal sources, the entrepreneur would bear the entire loss x. 
With limited liability, however, an entrepreneur facing a  K x - <  realization can liquidate   33 
the company, losing only her initial capital investment K.
19 The entrepreneur has an 
option not to pay.  
In other words, the entrepreneur, in addition to owning the return form the project x, 
also owns a put option to “sell” x, if it turns out to be a liability, for the price of  K -  (the 
value of this option is  ( ) ( ) K x K x E K x P - < - ￿ - < =Pr ). Therefore, cognitive biases 
affect the ex ante value of the project, as follows: optimism leads to overestimation of the 
project’s value, while overconfidence leads to underestimation of the project’s value (see 
Corollary 2).  
From a legal policy perspective, these results add to the debate over the desirability 
of limited liability (see, e.g., Hansmann and Kraakman, 1992). Limited liability induces 
excessive business activity. Optimism aggravates the excessive activity concern, while 
overconfidence lessens this concern.  Accordingly, if optimism  is the dominant bias 
among entrepreneurs (and there is evidence suggesting that optimism is in fact a problem 
in this context, see, e.g., Pinfold, 2001), this may provide a reason to limit limited 
liability.
20  
More fundamentally, however, both optimism and overconfidence limit the adverse 
effects of limited liability. These cognitive biases will lead the entrepreneur to 
                                                 
19 In practice, often the entrepreneur will simply stop paying her creditors, and the creditors will force 
liquidation. 
20  One way to limit the effects of limited liability is through the imposition o f a minimum capital 
requirement (i.e. a minimum  K) on an entrepreneur who wishes to establish a limited liability company 
(compare: Shavell, 2004). A m inimum capital requirement exists in the Netherlands for example. In the 
U.S. there is no general minimum capital requirement. Yet, in practice such a requirement is often imposed 
by lenders or rating agencies. The veil piercing doctrine also limits the effects of limited liability and thus 
can serve to counter the excessive activity problem created by the optimism bias. One branch of the veil 
piercing doctrine is based explicitly on the insufficient funding of the firm (rather than on fraud) (see Clark, 
1986, §2.4). The risk of veil piercing will likely induce the entrepreneur to increase her capital investment 
in the company. But even absent such an increase, the entrepreneur would have to consider the possibility 
that the veil will be pierced and her option—to pay only K—dissolved. (The related doctrine of equitable 
subordination has similar effects—see Clark, 1986, §2.3.)   34 
underestimate the likelihood that the project would ever produce  K x - < . In fact, given 
sufficiently high levels of optimism and overconfidence, the entrepreneur’s ex ante 
decisions will not be affected by limited liability. And, accordingly, legal policies and 
doctrines aimed at limiting the effects of limited liability would be of little consequence 
(from an ex ante perspective). 
 
3.5 Election of Remedies as Put Options 
An entitlement-holder’s option to choose between different remedies after her 
entitlement has been initially encroached upon can be characterized as a legal put option. 
The following examples from Ayres (forthcoming, pp. 24-25) are illustrative: 
“Contrary to accepted wisdom, the common law does use "put options"—the 
right to force a nonconsensual purchase—as a mechanism for protecting 
entitlements: (1) if Calabresi steals Melamed's watch, Melamed has the option 
of suing to recover the watch (replevin) or suing to receive the watch's value 
(trover); (2) if Calabresi is a holdover tenant in Melamed's apartment, 
Melamed has the option of suing to enjoin Calabresi's continuing trespass or 
(at least in some jurisdictions) suing to force Calabresi to rent for up to an 
entire additional year; and (3) if Calabresi builds an  encroaching wall on 
Melamed's land, Melamed has the option of suing to force Calabresi to 
remove  the wall or suing to force Calabresi to permanently buy the 
encroached land. In each of these examples, after Calabresi takes Melamed's 
entitlement, the common law gives Melamed a put  option—the option to 
choose court-determined damages (for permanently ceding the entitlement to 
the defendant) or injunctive relief (to require the entitlement).” 
 
Consider the following stylized “election of remedies” model. At T=0 individual X 
chooses whether to purchase a certain entitlement. At T=1 the entitlement will generate a 
stochastic utility x (to X), unless the entitlement is encroached upon by Y (in which case 
X enjoys zero utility from the entitlement). If Y encroaches upon X’s entitlement, X faces 
a choice between: (a) obtaining an injunction against Y that would end the encroachment   35 
and allow X to enjoy x, and (b) suing Y for money damages equal to a court-determined 
amount L. X has an option to force Y to purchase the entitlement for a price of L.  
At T=1 X already knows the realization of x, and thus will choose the injunction 
remedy  if and only if  L x > . The T=0 value of this option is 
( ) ( ) L x x L E L x P < - ￿ < =Pr  (discounted by the probability of encroachment). When the 
court-determined damage award, L, is known ex ante, this is a standard asset-based put 
option, with an exercise price of L. 
The T=0 value of the entitlement is influenced by the value of the election of 
remedies put option. Accordingly,  the perceived option value, as determined by the 
behavioral option pricing model, will affect an individual’s decision whether to acquire a 
certain entitlement or how much to invest in the underlying asset. Note, however, that 
since the individual owns the entitlement, as well as the put option to sell the entitlement, 
cognitive biases will also affect the non-option value component.  Specifically,  an 
optimistic individual would underestimate the value of the legal option, but would 
nevertheless overestimate the overall value of the entitlement plus the option. And an 
overconfident individual would underestimate the value of the legal option and thus 
underestimate the value of the entitlement plus the option. (See Corollary 2.) 
As argued above,  behavioral option pricing affects the perceived value of the 
entitlement, and thus influences the ex ante decisions of the option-holder how much to 
invest in the entitlement and whether to acquire the entitlement in the first place. 
Cognitive biases also affect the decision of the non-option-holder Y, whether to encroach 
on X’s entitlement (on the deterrence effects of the election of remedies option in a 
rational choice framework, see Ayres, forthcoming, pp. 48-52). From Y’s perspective, the   36 
expected value of encroachment is  ( ) ( ) L y L x - ￿ < Pr , where  y is the value of the 
entitlement to Y.  
Y’s perception or misperception of this value will directly affect the efficacy of the 
law’s attempt to protect entitlements by deterring encroachments. Specifically, assuming 
L y > , if  Y’s possibly biased perception of the distribution of  x values leads Y to 
overestimate  ( ) L x < Pr  and consequently to overestimate the value (to Y) of the 
encroachment, it may be desirable to try and boost deterrence. Conversely, if Y 
underestimates  ( ) L x < Pr  and consequently  underestimates the value (to Y) of the 
encroachment, overdeterrence may result.
21 Unfortunately, even if the direction of the 
distortion is known, it is not obvious how to calibrate the damages amount L to achieve 
optimal deterrence. Interestingly, and counterintuitively, raising the damages amount L 
will not necessarily increase deterrence (and lowering  L will not necessarily reduce 
deterrence). While higher damages reduce the value of encroachment in the event that X 
exercises her option to sell, higher damages also increase the likelihood that Y will be 
able to purchase the entitlement ( ( ) L x < Pr ), thus increasing the value of the 
encroachment to Y. 
 
3.6  A Right to Return 
The election of remedies option involves a choice between two distinct legal 
remedies: injunction and money damages.  In some  consumer contexts a similar put 
option is created simply by giving the buyer a right to return the merchandize. This right, 
while often the product of contractual design or maybe even business practice, is also in 
                                                 
21 If y is stochastic and might fall bellow L, the deterrence effect of X’s option to force a sale (in terms of 
deterring the initial encroachment) increases. See Ayres (forthcoming, pp. 49-50).   37 
some cases required by law (see, e.g., 16 CFR §429.1, specifying rescission rights in 
door-to-door sales). The exercise price of the put option created by the right to return 
merchandize is generally equal to the purchase price (although it can be smaller, for 
example when the seller gives less-fungible store credit, rather than money back).  
As in the election of remedies case, when a right to return attaches to a product, an 
optimistic individual would overestimate the value of the product, and an overconfident 
individual would underestimate the value of the product. A right to return encourages the 
purchase of goods with uncertain value to the consumer. From this perspective optimism 
can serve as a substitute for the right to return, while overconfidence dilutes the value of 
the option and may warrant an enhanced right to return. 
In the corporate context, a put option very similar to the one created by the right to 
return is created by the appraisal rights granted to shareholders. After a fundamental 
corporate change encroaches upon the shareholders’ entitlement, these shareholders are 
given a choice between retaining their shares and selling those shares back to the 
company for “fair value” (see, e.g., Clark, 1986, §10.6). 
From an ex  ante perspective, appraisal rights increase the value of the shares. 
Optimism similarly increases the perceived value of the shares, while overconfidence 
dilutes the value of the appraisal option and thus reduces the perceived value of the 
shares. To the extent that the appraisal remedy is designed to deter inefficient corporate 
changes that undermine shareholder value, the efficacy of the remedy depends on the 
cognitive biases that the non-option-holder suffers from. Specifically, the non-option-
holder’s estimate of the probability that shareholders will exercise their appraisal option   38 
will be affected by this party’s possibly biased perception of the distribution of the post-
change share values.
22 
If the direction of the distortion is known, the “fair value” exercise price may be 
used as a policy lever to correct for an excessive, or alternatively for an inadequate, level 
of corporate changes. Raising the “fair value” exercise price will increase deterrence by 
(1) raising the likelihood that shareholders will choose to exercise the appraisal option, 
and (2) reducing the value of the corporate change conditional upon exercise of the 
option. Accordingly, underdeterrence can be cured by raising the “fair value” standard, 
while overdeterrence can be cured by relaxing the “fair value” standard.  
 
3.7 Litigation Options 
“Filing a suit is analogous to purchasing an option.” (Cornell, 1990) The plaintiff 
has an option to proceed all the way to trial, to settle, or to drop the case. In fact, the 
plaintiff has many more options: to invest in discovery, to file different pre-trial motions, 
to present evidence and witnesses, to challenge the defendant’s evidence and witnesses, 
to appeal unfavorable decisions, etc’. These options increase the ex ante value of a law 
suite, and may even render an otherwise NPV suite a profitable prospect (see Cornell, 
1990; Bebchuk, 1996; Grundfest and Huang, 2004). 
How will an imperfectly rational plaintiff value these litigation options? Generally, 
optimism will increase the perceived value of a lawsuit, while overconfidence will reduce 
the perceived value of the law suit. However, the implications of behavioral option 
pricing in the litigation context are complicated by the strategic nature of the interaction 
                                                 
22 One important difference, as compared to the election-of-remedies case, is that here the non-option-
holder has substantial control over the post-change share value, which can be expected to affect her ex ante 
beliefs regarding the distribution of post-change share values.   39 
between plaintiff and defendant. For example, as shown by Grundfest and Huang (2004), 
while the value of litigation options are increasing in the variance of the underlying asset 
for a broad range of parameters, the litigation and settlement game may produce regions 
where a higher variance  reduces the ex ante value of the option. Accordingly, an 
overconfident plaintiff may theoretically overestimate the value of an option-bearing 
lawsuit.  
This ambiguity further complicates any attempt to deduce the descriptive 
implications of the behavioral option pricing model in the litigation context. From a 
normative perspective, imperfect rationality adds another dimension to “the fundamental 
divergence between the private and the social motive to use the legal system” (Shavell, 
1997).  
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
4.1 Extending the Behavioral Option Pricing Model 
The behavioral option pricing model studied in this paper focused on the optimism 
and overconfidence biases. These two biases, which correspond to the two fundamental 
moments of the distribution of an option’s underlying asset or liability, seem to be the 
natural starting point for an attempt to incorporate behavioral insights into option pricing 
theory. But option pricing can also be influenced by other behavioral phenomenon. This 
paper does not purport to offer a comprehensive behavioral option pricing model. Still it 
is prudent to at least mention a few additional behavioral forces that could potentially 
have a significant effect on option pricing.    40 
First, options involve multi-period decision-making. Hence, option pricing might be 
affected by temporal inconsistencies, such as  the preference reversals caused by 
hyperbolic discounting (see, generally, Loewenstein and Thaler, 1992, and Laibson, 
1997; see also Katz, 2004, pp. 33-34). For example, an option-holder might believe at 
T=0 that she will exercise the option at T=1, but nevertheless decide not to exercise the 
option at T=1.  
Another set of behavioral phenomena that can be expected to have a significant 
effect on option pricing falls under the alternate titles  of  ‘endowment effect,’  ‘loss 
aversion’ and ‘WTP-WTA disparity’ (or ‘bid-ask spread’). Individuals tend to demand 
more for selling an asset than what they would be willing to pay to acquire the same 
asset. The reduction in utility following a loss is greater than the utility increase from a 
gain of the same objective magnitude. These behavioral regularities directly affect option 
pricing. Specifically, put options will not be exercised as often as predicted by standard 
models. Moreover, the framing of an option may significantly affect the price of the 
option. An option to avoid a loss might be priced above an option to enjoy a gain of equal 
magnitude, even though these two options are identical from the perspective of rational 
option pricing theory. (See also Ayres, forthcoming, pp. 191-194.) 
Going back to the optimism bias, this paper focuses on optimism with respect to the 
value of the asset or liability underlying the option and with respect to the option’s 
exercise price. Arguably, however, optimism can operate directly on the overall value of 
the option. In other words, given the option framing of the legal choice an option-holder 
might be optimistic about the value of the option as a whole, without even considering 
the underlying asset or liability and the exercise price—the building blocks that   41 
determine an option’s value. While plausible, this type of optimism assumes a greater 
departure from perfect rationality, compared to the type of optimism incorporated into the 
proposed behavioral pricing model. For optimism to operate on the value of the option as 
a whole, it is necessary to assume that the option-holder does not understand the basic 
structure of the option. 
Moreover, it seems unlikely in the legal options context that the option framing is 
so powerful that it obscures the basic choice that underlies the option. The perception of 
the option as an asset in its own right, subject to optimism, would be more plausible in 
the financial options context, but not so much so  in the context of real options and 
specifically legal options. Most likely individuals holding legal options do not think of 
the legal choice as a distinct asset. 
 
4.2 Legal Rules and Endogenous Biases 
I have thus far assumed that the levels of the cognitive biases are exogenously given 
and fixed. This assumption is helpful for understanding the short-run effects of option-
creating rules. It is also helpful when changes in the level of the biases are likely 
independent of the legal rule. But cognitive biases are not necessarily fixed or exogenous. 
Market selection forces or cultural transmission mechanisms can alter the distribution of 
biases in the market or in the population (see, e.g., Waldman, 1994; Kyle and Wang, 
1997; Heifetz and Spiegel, 1999; and Bar-Gill, 2002). If accurate option pricing is 
advantageous,
23 these dynamic processes can be expected to produce bias combinations 
that lead to accurate option pricing. Interestingly, since the two biases often lead to 
                                                 
23 In some cases, inaccurate pricing can be advantageous. See, generally, Schelling (1960) and Frank 
(1988) – demonstrating the potential advantage of imperfect rationality in strategic interactions.   42 
countervailing distortions, individuals with positive levels of optimism and 
overconfidence can price options accurately. Thus, the positive bias levels that we 
observe in the real world do not necessarily imply inaccurate option pricing and 
suboptimal behavior. Moreover, if the dynamic, bias-molding forces are sufficiently 
powerful, then accurate option pricing will always occur, and policymakers might as well 
rely on the simpler rational pricing model. The problem, of course, is that the dynamic 
processes leading to these optimal bias combinations will often be slow and inaccurate. 
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Appendix 
The Appendix collects the proofs of Proposition 1 and Corollary 2. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
I begin by proving both parts of the proposition for the call option. 
(i)  Optimism implies:  ) ( ) ( ˆ opt x f x f D - = .  ( ) ￿
D +
￿ D - ￿ - =
opt b
p
opt dx x f p x P ) ( ˆ . And 
( ) ( ) ￿
D +
￿ D - ￿ - - ￿ - D + = D ¶ ¶
opt b
p
opt opt opt dx x f p x b f p b P ) ( ' ) ( ˆ , or, after some simplification, 
0 ) ( 1 ˆ > D - - = D ¶ ¶
opt opt p F P . 
(ii) Consider first the case where  p x £ ˆ .  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] [ ] p b p x x E b p x P - ˛ ￿ ˛ = , , Pr .  An 
overconfident individual would underestimate both  ( ) [ ] b p x , Pr ˛  and  ( ) [ ] b p x x E , ˛ , and 
would thus  underprice the option. Next consider the case where  p x > ˆ .  Divide the 
domain  ( ) b a,  to the following four regions: (1) ( ) p a, , (2) ( ) x p ˆ , , (3) ( ) ) ˆ ( ˆ ~ , ˆ p x x x x - + = , 
and (4)  ( ) b x, ~ , such that  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 1
~ , ˆ Pr ˆ , Pr q x x x x p x ” ˛ = ˛  and 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 2 , ~ Pr , Pr q b x x p a x ” ˛ = ˛ .  ( ) [ ] [ ] x x p x E q x p x p x E q P ~ ~ , 2 2 1 > - ￿ + ˛ - ￿ = , or, 
[ ] p x p x E q p x P < - ￿ - - = 2 ˆ  (since  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] x x p x x E x p x x E ˆ ~ , ~ , = ˇ = ˛ ). The truncating 
effect created by the option increases  P above  p x - ˆ  by  [ ] [ ] p x x E p q < - ￿ 2 . 
Overconfidence reduces both  2 q  and  [ ] [ ] p x x E p < -  (since it increases  [ ] p x x E < ), 
leading to undervaluation of the option, i.e.,  P P < ˆ .   47 
Next consider the put option. The value of the put option equals  x p ˆ -  plus the value of 
the call option (( ) ￿ ￿ - = - + -
p
a
b
p
dx x f x p dx x f p x x p ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ˆ ). Accordingly, the effect of 
overconfidence on the valuation of the put option follow immediately from the effect 
derived for the call option. The effect of optimism can also be derived using the results 
obtained for the call option: 
[ ] 0 ) ( ) ( 1 1 ˆ 1 ˆ < D - - = D - - + - = D ¶ ¶ + - = D ¶ ¶
opt opt opt Call opt Put p F p F P P . 
QED 
 
Proof of Corollary 2 
(i) The perceived value of the activity is  P x V ˆ ˆ ˆ + = , where  P ˆ  is the perceived value of 
the option. Consider first an activity including an asset plus a put option to sell the asset. 
Since  ) ( ˆ opt opt Put p F P D - - = D ¶ ¶  (see proof of Proposition 1), I obtain: 
0 ) ( 1 ˆ > D - - = D ¶ ¶
opt opt p F V . 
Next consider an activity including a liability plus a put option to unload the liability. 
Recall that the value of a liability-based put is equal to the value of an asset-based call. 
Therefore, I can use the derivative  ) ( 1 ˆ opt opt p F P D - - = D ¶ ¶  (from the proof of 
Proposition 1), subject to the redefinition of optimism with respect to a cost/liability 
distribution as 
opt optC D - = D , to obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 ) ( ) ( 1 1 ˆ 1 ˆ > D + = D + - - + = D ¶ D ¶ ￿ D ¶ ¶ + = D ¶ ¶
optC optC optC opt opt optC p F p F P V .   48 
(ii) Since overconfidence reduces  P ˆ  (see Corollary 1(ii)) and since  x ˆ  is not affected by 
overconfidence, overconfidence leads to  underestimation of the value of the activity, 
P x V ˆ ˆ ˆ + = . 
QED 
 
 